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Mastering the financial crisis – The French approach
by
Pierre-Henri Conac1
France suffered from the financial crisis originating from the United States in
2007 like all other European countries. However, the French banking sector
was significantly less impacted by the financial crisis than other European
countries. This lead France to adopt a financial rescue plan including a
recapitalisation and a refinancing scheme presenting technical and sometimes
fundamental differences with other European countries. France also took a
very hard view on managers’ and traders’ compensation. Measures adopted
during the financial crisis on compensation as temporary counterparty imposed
on banks and financial institutions might probably become partially or totally
permanent.
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Introduction
France suffered from the financial crisis originating from the United States
like all other European countries.
1 Professor at the University of Luxembourg, LLM (Columbia Law School), ECGI
Research Associate. E-Mail : phconac@wanadoo.fr. This article originates from a
conference in June 2009 at Bucerius Law School, and from the 4th ECFR Symposium in
October 2009.
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The crisis started to gain public notice in June 2007 when two highly leveraged
funds of Bear Stern2 invested in subprime loans had to be liquidated. However,
at this time, many observers still believed that the crisis was limited to a
specific portion of the real estate market and would be contained to the United
States. It did not prove so. In Europe, the German IKB bank, who had also
heavily invested into subprime loans, had to be bailed out in August 2007.
Shares of other European banks started to decrease regularly and significantly
in value for fear that their balance sheet would be exposed to the US subprime
market. In March 2008, Bear Stern had to be purchased by JP Morgan Chase,
acting with the support of the US Treasury and the Federal Reserve, in order
to prevent a bank failure. On Monday September 15, Lehman Brothers
Holdings Inc. (LBHI) filed for Chapter 11 protection in the Bankruptcy
Court for the Southern District of New York after no more buyer could be
found for the firm when the US Treasury refused to provide funding or
guarantees for a rescue3. The decision to let Lehman fail took the market by
surprise. This forced the US Government to adopt rescue measures. Few days
later, on Friday, the announcement of the Troubled Assets Relief Program
(TARP) by the US Treasury, which consisted in purchasing or insuring up to
$700 Billion of « troubled assets », initiated a panic which sent the S&P 500
lower by 28 % until October 10, when a change to a TARP equity plan was
announced4. In between, Congress adopted in emergency the Economic
Emergency Stabilization Act on October 3, 2008 which gave power to the US
Treasury to put TARP in practice5. The lack of transparency on the assets held
by the banks increased the confidence crisis and threatened the financial
stability of the banking system in many countries. Financial markets in
European countries also collapsed and shares of banks were particularly hit.
In Europe, many banks were also affected by the panic which followed the
Lehman collapse and had to request or to receive public support, since private
markets were closed to them unless they would be willing to pay an
uneconomic price. Due to the closure of public markets, States suddenly
became the lender of first and last resort for many banks. Among the most
affected banks in Europe, immediately after the Lehman bankruptcy, were
2 These funds were the « Bear Stearn High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Fund » and
the « Bear Stearn High-Grade Structured Credit Strategies Enhanced Leveraged Fund ».
The losses from the funds amounted to $1.8 billion. The two managers of the funds were
arrested and sued criminally in the US but where acquited by a jury in November 2009. A
civil suit from the SEC for fraud is still pending (SEC v. Cioffi, 08-CV-2457, U.S. District
Court for the Eastern District of New York, Brooklyn).
3 The Bankruptcy court appointed an examiner which issued a report in March 2010 on the
causes of the Lehman collapse and the potential liabilities associated. This report is
available at : http://lehmanreport.jenner.com/
4 The S&P 500 tumbled from 1255 to 899 between September 19 and October 10.
5 Public Law 110 –343 (Pub. L. 110 – 343,122 Stat. 3765, enacted October 3, 2008).
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banks in Iceland, Ireland, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Germany and
Switzerland. This lead governments in these countries to adopt emergency
measures to bail-out failing banks on an ad hoc basis and/or to adopt general
schemes to offer capital and financing to financial institutions. For instance, in
the United Kingdom, a plan which served as a model in Europe and in the US
was announced on 8 October 2008 which included guarantees and recapital-
ization measures. It therefore differed from the TARP plan which considered
direct purchase of mortgage backed securities but the US Treasury announced
two days later its intention instead to recapitalize the banks. A similar plan was
adopted in Germany with the Financial Market Stabilisation Fund Act
(FMStG) which entered into force on 18 October 20086. However, the
situation was very different from country to country7. In some countries, the
crisis affected mostly one or two large financial institutions whose balance
sheet had grown disproportionate to the size of the country, making it harder
and more risky for Governments to rescue them. This is the case for instance
of Switzerland with UBS8 and Belgium with Fortis and Dexia. Other
countries were exposed to a large number of ailing banks, sometimes before
the Lehman bankruptcy, like the United Kingdom (Northern Rock, RBS,
HBOS….), Ireland and Germany (IKB, Sachsen LB, HRE…). France was also
affected by the financial crisis although to a much lesser extent than many
other European countries. Despite this favorable situation, the French
government also took emergency measures and adopted a general scheme to
provide capital and liquidity to major banks.
The French financial rescue measures were adopted quickly by a law during
the same period as the American, British and German plans9.
The main instrument was the law on Finance n82008 –1061 of October 16,
2008 which was adopted within one week and came into force on 18 October
2008. The law included a recapitalisation and a refinancing scheme10. A
6 BGBl I, No. 46, page 1982. On the German plan, see. Klaus J. Hopt, Christoph Kumpan
and Felix Steffek, Preventing Bank Insolvencies in the Financial Crisis: The German
Financial Markets Stabilisation Act, European Business Organization Law Review
(2009).
7 For a presentation of the different plans, See. Ana Petrovic and Ralf Tutsch, National
rescue measures in response to the current financial crisis, ECB Legal Working Paper
Series, n88, July 2009, available at: www.ecb.int/pub/pdf/scplps/ecblwp8.pdf
8 On the difficulties of UBS see. Myret Zaki, UBS. Les dessous d’un scandale., ed. Favre,
Switzerland, 2008, 220 pp.
9 On the French rescue plan, see. G. A. Cavalier, French Interventions in the Financial
Crisis, available at www.ssrn.com; R. Parolai, D. de Mouy, B. Fatier, F. Lacroix, C.
Dragan, French Action Plan to Restore Confidence in the Banking System (Update),
RTDF no 4/2008, p. 18.
10 Law on Finance for the financing of the Economy n82008-1061 of October 16, 2008, JO
17 October 2008, p. 15905.
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specific law on finance was necessary since a guarantee provided by the State
must be approved by the Parliament through such legal instrument11.This Act
was followed by another law on Finance n82009 – 431 of April 20, 200912.
There were also several more specific acts which related to the financial crisis.
One was the law n82009 – 715 of June 18, 2009 on the merger of Groupe Caisses
d’épargne and Groupe Banques Populaires13. Another one was the law
n82009 – 1955 of 9 October 2009 on access to credit for small and medium size
enterprises and to improve the functioning of financial markets14.
Two decrees were of great importance. The first one was the decree n8 2009 –
348 of March 30, 2009 on managers’ compensation of banks aided by the State
and the second one was the decree n8 2009 – 445 of April 20, 2009 on the Social
and economic development fund, which mostly amended the first one.
Although they present some similarities, financial rescue measures and legal
problems raised during the course of these actions have been different in the
Member States. Therefore, it is interesting to look, as an example, at the French
approach to mastering the financial crisis. France is also interesting since it
held the European Union Council presidency between July and December
2008, and was therefore very influential at the EU level at a time when the
crisis was the most severe and individual and general schemes were adopted in
many European countries.
Before presenting the financial rescue measures adopted by France (II) and the
regulations and obligations imposed on banks (III), it is necessary to present
the European framework and the comparatively favorable French situation
(I).
I. The European framework and the French situation
The European institutions played an important role in fighting the financial
crisis. Some countries even called for an European financial bailout plan but it
was finally refused. Therefore, financial rescues plans have been adopted at the
level of States and not at the EU level. This solution was logical because plans
implied using national taxpayer money for saving national banks. However,
all European institutions played a role in mastering the financial crisis (A).
France financial rescue measures benefited but were also subject to this
11 Art. 34 of the Loi Organique sur les lois de finance.
12 Law on Finance n82009-431 of April 20, 2009, JO 22 April 2009, p. 6872.
13 Law n82009-715 of June 18, 2009 relative à l’organe central des caisses d’épargne et des
banques populaires, 19 June 2009, p. 9971.
14 Law n82009-1955 of 9 October 2009 on access to credit for small and medium size
enterprises and to improve the functionning of financial markets, JO 20 October 2009,
p. 1740.
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European framework, especially in the area of competition rules. However,
the situation of French banks was relatively favourable (B).
A. The European framework
All European institutions played a role in mastering the financial crisis. The
first ones are the European Central Bank (ECB) and the European Investment
Bank (EIB) which provided financing (18). The other ones are the ECOFIN
and the Eurogroup which provided guidelines for national rescue plans (28).
The last one was the European Commission which had to approve all State
aids to financial institutions (38).
18) The ECB and the EIB
In order to help financial institutions, the ECB reduced its interest rate on the
main refinancing operations of banks from 4,25 % to 3,75 % on 8 October
2008 in coordination with the Bank of England and the Federal Reserve. The
rate has been reduced regularly since and has stayed at 1 % since May 2009.
This helped banks to borrow money from the ECB at a very low cost. On 23
October 2008, the ECB also extended significantly the eligibility criteria for
collateral in order to substitute itself to the interbank market which normally
allowed banks to refinance themselves for short term loans. However, this left
open the problem of longer term refinancing (one year and more) which was
then dealt with by the States. On May 7 2009, the ECB decided to purchase
euro-denominated covered bonds (Obligations foncières, Pfandbriefe) issued
in the euro area, for an amount of EUR 60 billion from July 2009 to June 2010.
The ECB also provided input on the recommendations issued by the
Commission as to the level of compensation to be requested from banks and as
to the valuation of certain securitised assets on the balance sheets of financial
institutions15.
The European Investment Bank (EIB) was asked by the Ecofin Council to
provide E 30 billion for financing small and medium business enterprises.
15 ‘The pricing of recapitalisations’ – Confidential ECB-Eurosystem document, 20
November 2008.
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28) The ECOFIN and the Eurogroup
The ECOFIN Council of 7 October 2008 led to a statement, whose
inspiration was in line with the French plan. According to that, Governments
should be in a position to force a change of management and have the power to
intervene in compensation16. Few days later, on 12 October 2008, a meeting of
the Eurogroup led to the “Paris Declaration” which stated that Governments
of the Euro Area were ready to take proper action in a concerted and
coordinated manner to improve market functioning over longer term
maturities and notably by facilitating the funding of banks through govern-
ment guarantees of bank debt and recapitalisation17. It also provided a
Guideline for national rescue plans. The declaration also called for « flexi-
bility » in the implementation of accounting rules which was a call, successful,
to the International Accounting Standards Board (IASB) to soften the
interpretation of « mark-to-market » rules in order to align them with the
interpretation adopted in the United States by the Financial Accounting
Standards Board (FASB)18.
38) The Commission
The role of the EU Commission was essential mostly because all financial aids
from States to financial institutions had to be approved as being State aids.
Several States, including France for the Dexia plan19, argued that these were
not State aids since the level of interest was close to the one that would have
been paid to private investors under « normal conditions ». But, the
Commission argued that remuneration must be assessed not with regard to
16 The text of the Conclusion is available at : http://www.eu2008.fr/PFUE/lang/en/
accueil/PFUE-10_2008/PFUE-07.10.2008/ECOFIN_results.html
17 The text of the declaration is available at : http://www.eu2008.fr/PFUE/lang/en/
accueil/PFUE-10_2008/PFUE-12.10.2008/sommet_pays_zone_euro_declaration_-
plan_action_concertee.html
18 On 13 October 2008, the IASB adopted amendments to IAS 39 Financial Instruments:
Recognition and Measurement and of IFRS 7 Financial Instruments: Disclosures.On 31
October, the IASB published a document setting out guidance on important measure-
ment issues affecting the valuation of financial instruments when an active market does
not exist. The IASB’s guidance makes clear inter alia that transaction prices and broker
or pricing service quotes might be inputs when measuring fair value, but may not be
determinate if an active market does not exist. These new interpretation were then
adopted by the EU. Commission Regulation (EC) No 1126/2008 of 3 November 2008
adopting certain international accounting standards in accordance with Regulation
(EC) No 1606/2002 of the European Parliament and of the Council, OJ L 320, 29
.11.2008, p. 1.
19 Decision of 19 November 2008 in Case No NN 50/08 (now transferred to Case No C 9/
09) Dexia – FR, p. 6.
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any ’normal’ functioning of the market but by taking into consideration the
circumstances which existed at the time of the operation. At the time no
private investors would have lent money to Dexia or similarly situated banks.
Therefore, all financial measures adopted by Member States were State aids
which had to be notified ex-ante and approved by the Commission20.
The Commission played a positive role because it adopted a flexible
interpretation of the EC Treaty. State aids to individual companies in
difficulties are normally assessed under article 107(3)(c) of the Treaty on the
Functioning of the European Union (TFEU)21 which deals with « aid to
facilitate the development of certain economic activities … » and the
Community Guidelines on State aid for rescuing and restructuring firms in
difficulty22. Before the Lehman bankruptcy, the Commission used this article
for rescue plan of individual institutions such as Northern Rock in 200723 or
West LB in 200824. However, this article did not fit with the situation since the
crisis had widened and threatened several institutions, some of them not being
insolvent. In addition, some institutions needed immediately “restructuring
aid” which under the Guidelines were only available after six months. The
very legitimacy of State aid control in this situation was raised and the
Commission was put under political pressure from several Member States,
mainly France and Germany, to soften its approach.
Therefore, instead of using article 107(3)(c), the Commission accepted to use
article 107(3)(b) of the Treaty which allows State aids « to remedy a serious
disturbance in the economy of a Member State ». This article had only been
used once before, in 1987, for Greece25. The Commission had refused to allow
France to invoke this provision in 1995 when it bailed out the Crédit Lyonnais
because the plan concerned only one bank and not the banking sector as a
whole and there was no systemic crisis26. But the possibility to invoke this
article in case of « systemic crisis » had been accepted. In its October 13, 2008
Communication on “The application of State aid rules to measures taken in
relation to financial institutions in the context of the current global financial
crisis”27, the Commission created a specific framework for bank rescue plans.
20 Art. 107 Treaty on the Functionning of the European Union (TFEU).
21 Article 87(3)(c) of the EC Treaty before the entry into force of the Lisbon Treaty
22 OJ C 244, 1.10.2004, p. 2.
23 Commission Decision of 5 December 2007, NN 70/07 UK, rescue aid to Northern
Rock.
24 Commission Decision of 30 April 2008, NN 25/2008 West LB riskshied.
25 Commission Decision of 7 October 1987 concerning Law 1386/1983 by which the
Greek Government grants aid to Greek industry, JOCE n8 L 076 of 22/03/1988 p. 18.
26 Décision 85/547/CE of the Commission of 26 July 1995, portant approbation
conditionnée de l’aide accordée par la France à la banque Crédit Lyonnais, JOCE n8
L 308 du 21/12/1995 p. 0092-0119.
27 OJ C 270, 25.10.2008, p. 8.
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The failure of a large bank in Member States was accepted by the Commission
as being able to fulfill the condition of a « serious disturbance ». In addition to
accepting ad hoc measures for specific banks, the Commission also accepted to
validate general rescue scheme. A last point in the Communication was that
the Commission made a major distinction between financially sound
institutions, which needed less substantial restructuring but could receive
financial aid whereas this was not admitted by the Guidelines, and financial
institutions characterised by endogenous problems which would be subject to
far reaching restructuring. This was important for France since French banks
were considered to be financially sound. A second communication of January
15, 2009 dealt with « The recapitalisation of financial institutions in the
current financial crisis : limitation of aid to the minimum necessary and
safeguards against undue distortions of competition »28. The Commission
accepted that the then current market price for loans to banks of 15 % would
not be used to assess the price of recapitalisation aid. Another major point was
that state aids should be designed in a way that provides incentives for banks to
redeem the State as soon as market circumstances would permit. A third
Communication of 25 February 2009 dealt with the evaluation and treatment
of impaired or toxic assets29. A fourth Communication dealt with the “return
to viability and the assessment of restructuring measures in the financial sector
in the current crisis under the State aid rules”30.
Finally, because of the urgency of the situation of some banks and the need to
have a quick answer, sometimes during the weekend, the EU Commissioner in
charge of Competition policy was given the right to approve individual and
collective State aids instead of the whole Commission. Therefore, many
authorisation were granted by the Commission between September and
November 2008, generally as fast as one week.
The French rescue plan was subject to these rules. However, the situation of
French financial institutions was more favorable than in some other European
countries.
B. The French situation
The French banking sector has been significantly less impacted by the
financial crisis than other European countries. French banks had globally a
limited exposure to US subprime loans. According to the French Central
Bank, as of mid-2009 asset writedowns linked to toxic assets represented 16 %
of Tier 1 for French banks compared to 33 % in Germany and in the United
28 OJ C 10, 15.01.2009, p. 2.
29 OJ C 72, 26.03.2009, p. 1.
30 OJ C 195, 19.08.2009, p. 9.
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Kingdom31. This is in addition to the fact that French banks had apparently
marked down by mid 2009 more their toxic assets, by 60 %, than UK or
German banks, with 20 %32. This does not mean that all French banks escaped
the financial crisis. There were two major casualties, Dexia which is
technically a Belgian bank, and Natixis. The reasons for this favorable
situation are not easy to determine (18) but it had a major influence on the
French financial rescue plan (28).
18) Possible reasons for France favorable situation
There might have been several reasons to this favorable situation: a more
conservative business model, a a more conservative behaviour, a better
regulation and, possibly, “luck”.
A first reason is that the French banking sector business model was rather
conservative. French banking sector is highly concentrated with seven major
groups representing most of the market. These groups are BNP Paribas,
Société Générale, Crédit Agricole (which includes the Crédit Lyonnais),
Crédit Mutuel, Groupe Banques Populaires and Groupe Caisses d’Epargne.
All of these groups are universal banks which means that, contrary to the US
investment banks, they had stable funding through deposits. Although some
of them also had large investment bank activities (Société Générale ; Banques
Populaires and Caisses d’Epargne through their subsidiary Natixis), the
existence of a large deposit base made them less vulnerable to a bank run. In
addition, most of their profits originated from the retail part and the asset
management part with only a limited part originating from investment bank
activities. Only Société Générale had a large part of its profits, close to 30 % in
2005 and 2006, coming from its investment bank activities33.
French banks managers and consumers were also more conservative. First,
French banks had high capital ratio and some of them raised capital before the
emergency measures were adopted. The six most important French banking
groups had raised 17,95 billions euros before the emergency measures were
adopted. Second, French banks were more conservative as to subprimes. For
instance, BNP Paribas was not materially exposed to subprime loans. Crédit
Agricole, through its investment bank subsidiary Calyon, was issuing
Collaterized Debt Obligations (CDO) but only kept a few portion of the
31 See. Cour des comptes, Rapport public, Les concours publics aux établissements de
crédit : premiers constats, premières Recommandations, June 2009, p. 86. The report is
available at : http://www.ccomptes.fr/fr/CC/Publications-RPT.html. A second report
was published in May 20.
32 See. Ibid.
33 See. Société Générale 2010 Registration Document, p. 16.
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highest grades CDOs on its balance sheet and stopped this securitisation
activity in February 200734. One of the reasons for being more conservative
might be that some of these banks where mutualist banks with strong controls
from the regional banks. For instance, Crédit Agricole is owned by regional
banks who tend to be conservative. French consumers also tend, for cultural
reasons, to be more conservative than in some other countries and are
reluctant to enter into debt. This reduced also the risk that the level of debt of
French consumers would form a bubble.
A third reason is that French legislation and regulation was more conservative
than in other countries, although this started to change shortly before the crisis
occurred.
As to capital ratio, the banking regulator, the Banking Commission
(Commission bancaire), replaced since 2010 by the Prudential Control
Authority (Autorité de Contrôle Prudentiel or ACP)35, was more conservative
than other European regulators. European banks are subject to the Basel
Committee on Banking Supervision regulation on Capital ratio (Cooke ratio),
which was implemented in Europe by the 1989 Capital Adequacy directive36.
According to the Basel I capital ratio, introduced into French law in 199137,
banks need to have a 8 % ratio of capital against weighted assets. The capital is
divided, according to the quality of the capital, into Tier 1 Capital, Tier 2
Capital, which cannot represent more than 50 % of the Tier 1 capital, and Tier
3 capital. Tier 1 capital is the highest quality capital (original own funds) and is
composed of ordinary shares, reserves and preferred shares which satisfy
certain criteria. It is itself divided into Core Tier 1, which can be taken into
account without any limitation, and non-core Tier 1 (innovative and non
innovative hybrid capital) which is capped and cannot be more than a certain
percentage of the Core Tier 1. In 1998 the Basel committee capped innovative
34 Rapport d’information déposé en application de l’article 145 du Règlement par la
Commission des finances, de l’Economie générale et du plan relatif à la crise financière
internationale et présenté par MM Didier Migaud, Président et Gilles Carrez,
rapporteur général, Assemblée Nationale, n8 1235, Enregistré à la Présidence de
l’Assemblée nationale le 5 novembre 2008. p. 246. The report is available at http://
www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rap-info/i1235.asp.
35 Ordinance no 2010-76 of 21 January 2010 portant fusion des autorités d’agrément et de
contrôle de la banque et de l’assurance, OJ of 22 january 2010 p 1392. On the reform See.
Th. Bonneau, Commentaire de l’ordonnance n82010-76 du 21 janvier 2010 portant
fusion des autorités d’agrément et de contrôle de la banque et de l’assurance, JCP éd. E.
11 february 2010, 1140. See also, P.-H Conac, The reform of the French financial
supervision structure : « Twin-Peaks » revolution on the menu. Liber Amicorum Klaus
Hopt, De Gruyter, 2010.
36 Council Directive 89/647/EEC of 18 December 1989 on a solvency ratio for credit
institutions, OJ L 386 , 30.12.1989 p.14..
37 Regulation CRBF n8 91-05 of 15 February 1991 regarding solvency ratio.
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hybrid capital at 15 % of Tier 138. In 2004, the French Banking Commission
imposed that hybrid capital (innovative and non innovative) be limited to
25 % of Core Tier 1. This level was more conservative than the one in the
United Kingdom where hybrid capital could represent 50 % of Core Tier 1
capital39. Therefore, French banks entered the financial crisis with a better
quality capital and a Tier 1 ratio above the 4 % level required by regulators.
The Basel I ratio was replaced in 2004 by the Basel II ratio (Mc Donough
ratio), which notably allows for using internal models to determine the risk of
certain assets, but did not modify the 8 % solvency ratio. The Basel II ratio
was implemented in Europe by the Capital Requirement Directive (CRD) of
14 June 200640and, at the outset of the crisis, in France by two 2007 ministerial
order41.
Another favorable point is that subprimes could not have been easily
developed in France since there are many legal protections for borrowers,
some of them which are court made. In addition, contrary to the situation in
the US were usury laws were repealed in the 1980 s42, usury laws apply to
mortgage loans to consumers and prevent banks from applying very high
interest rates in order to cover the increased risk on these loans43. This made it
more difficult for risky loans to be provided by banks, contrary to the United
States where there was no meaningful subprime borrower protection. The
only way to make borrowers more creditworthy in France was to increase the
duration of the loans, which actually did happen shortly before the crisis.
Loans were first extended to 30 years and then after a legal reform, in 2007 to
40 and 50 years44. However, this was the time when the financial crisis started
38 Sidney Press release : Instruments eligible for inclusion in Tier 1 capital (27 October
1998), available at http://www.bis.org/press/p981027.htm
39 FSA handbook – General Prudential sourcebook, available at http://fsahandbook.info
40 Directive 2006/49/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 14 June 2006
on the capital adequacy of investment firms and credit institutions (recast), OJ L. 177,
30.06.2006, p. 201.
41 Ministerial order of 20 february 2007 relatif aux exigences de fonds propres applicables
aux établissements de crédit et aux entreprises d’investissement, JO 1st March 2007, p.
3796. Ministerial order of 20 February 2007 modifiant les règlements du Comité de la
réglementation bancaire no 90-02, no 90-15, no 91-05, no 92-12, no 93-05 et no 95-02 et
les règlements du Comité de la réglementation bancaire et financière no 96-15, no 97-02,
no 97-04, no 98-04, no 99-06, no 99-07, no 99-15, no 99-16, no 2000-03 et no 2002-13, en
application de l’arrêté du 20 février 2007 relatif aux exigences de fonds propres
applicables aux établissements de crédit et aux entreprises d’investissement, JO 1st
March 2007, p. 3880.
42 Depositary Institutions Deregulatory and Monetary Control Act (DIDMCA) of 1980.
43 Art. L. 313 – 3 Consumer code.
44 An Ordinance of 2006 authorised mortgages up to 50 years instead of 35 years before.
Art. 2434. Civil code. Ordinance n8 2006– 346 of 23 march 2006 relative aux sûretés, JO
n871 of 24 march 2006 p. 4475.
Mastering the financial crisis – The French approachECFR 2/2010 307
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
which prevented this type of loan to develop. In 2006, the French government
also introduced a US inspired mortgage equity withdrawal (hypothèque
rechargeable), which allows the owner of a home to use the reimbursed part of
his mortgage for consumption45. This mechanism, helped by rising home
prices, had significantly spurred growth in the US after 2001. However, this
reform only entered into force in France in January 2007, at a time when the
financial crisis was about to start. These factors prevented a real estate bubble
from forming in France, contrary to the situation in the United States.
Finally, French banks might have been simply lucky. The Kerviel fraud was
discovered in February 2008. It first forced the Société Générale to increase its
capital by 5,5 billion euros in order to cover the loss of 4,9 billion euros
incurred after unwinding 50 billion euros of unauthorised positions. How-
ever, the fraud also forced Société Générale to reduce its investment bank
activities at an early stage in the financial crisis46. The fraud quickly lead the
Ministry of the Economy to adopt guidelines in order to better monitor
market risks. Other French banks activities were put under scrutiny by the
Banking Commission and were subject to more on site inspection47. In a sense,
the Kerviel fraud, put French banks investment bank activities under
increased regulatory scrutiny which might have had a chilling effect on risk
taking.
28) Specificities of the French rescue measures in comparison with other
Member States
Since the French banking system was less affected than in other countries, the
French financial measures present some specificities in comparison with other
countries.
There was no creation of a «public bad bank» for acquisition of toxic assets
such as in Germany or Ireland (National Asset Management Agency or
NAMA). This solution had been used in France in the case of the failure of the
Crédit Lyonnais in 1995. However, it was not used this time because the
situation of French banks was not so severe as to require such tool. However,
45 Art. 2422 Civil code. Ordinance n8 2006– 346 of 23 march 2006 relative aux sûretés, JO
n871 of 24 march 2006 p. 4475.
46 On the Kerviel fraud, various reports were requested or produced by the Société
Générale management. See. Société Générale, Inspection Générale, Mission Green,
Rapport de synthèse, 20 february 2008 ; Société Générale, Inspection Générale, Mission
Green, Rapport de synthèse, 20 May 2008 ; Report of the board of directors to the
general shareholders’ meeting, 22 May 2008 ; PricewaterhouseCoopers, Synthèse du
diagnostic de PwC et analyse du plan d’action, 23 May 2008. See also, Sanction decision
of the Banking commission, Société Générale, July 2008.
47 Banking Commission annual report 2008, p. 103.
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there were two exceptions. The first one was Dexia, where a portfolio of toxic
assets guaranteed by several States was put into a run-off mode. A second
exception was Natixis, with a 33 billion euros bad bank, but organized by the
controlling shareholders themselves, after recapitalisation by the State.
Similarly, there was no nationalisation or quasi nationalisation of banks, such
as in the United Kingdom, Ireland, Iceland, Germany and Austria. The
recapitalisation of Dexia amounts to a partial nationalisation but was an
isolated event. France also ruled out a direct State guarantee on bank loans
since it was not necessary, would have been risky and it did not fit with the
objective to increase lending to the economy.
Finally, there was no unlimited guarantee on deposits as in Ireland or in the
United Kingdom. The reason is that the situation was considered not so
difficult as in the countries which adopted the measure and there was no bank
run. On the contrary, such an announcement could have had the contrary
effect to create the impression that there was a problem48. Therefore, the 30
September 2008 decision by Ireland to provide for an unlimited guarantee of
deposits, which was quickly followed by Greece, Austria, Denmark and
Germany, was not copied in France. However, on 25 September 2008 in
Toulon, the French president declared during a public speech that in case a
bank would file for bankruptcy, no depositor would lose money. This
amounted to an implicit guarantee on all deposits. The French guarantee was
of 70,000 euros. A revision of the EU deposit guarantee scheme took place in
March 2009 and raised the minimum guarantee from 20,000 euros to 50,000
euros, and 100,000 euros by 31 December 201049.
Given this relatively favorable situation, French financial rescue measures
presented some differences with other countries.
II. Financial rescue measures
Like other European countries, France adopted a plan to finance the banking
sector (A). However, the French Government also had to adopt or encourage
specific measures for some banks (B).
48 Rapport d’information déposé en application de l’article 145 du Règlement par la
Commission des finances, de l’Economie générale et du plan relatif à la crise financière,
op. cit.
49 Directive 2009/14/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 11 March 2009
amending Directive 94/19/EC on deposit-guarantee schemes as regards the coverage
level and the payout delay, OJ L 68, 13.3.2009, p. 3.
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A. Financing the banking sector
Like in many other countries, the French scheme for banks, organised by the
law of 16 October 2008 on finance took the form of a recapitalisation scheme
(18) and a refinancing scheme (28).
18) Recapitalization of the banking sector
The recapitalisation scheme was made in two periods through a state-owned
investment company, the Société de prise de participation de l’État (SPPE).
The goal of the scheme was not to save ailing banks but was a precautionary
measure designed to increase the capital ratios of French banks in order to
allow them to extend credit50.
The SPPE is a simplified joint stock corporation (Société par actions simplifiée)
with the French State as its sole shareholder. In order to finance itself, the
SPPE issued bonds guaranteed by the French State on a case by case decision
to be taken by the Ministry for the Economy. The bonds issued are short term
bonds because banks have a strong incentive to reimburse quickly the capital
injection. In addition, the yield on the 10 years note was around 4 % against
2 % for short term notes (commercial paper) which created an incentive to
finance the SPPE with short term bonds. The amount issued was included in
the debt according to Maastricht standards.
The first capital injection in French financial institutions did not take the form
of ordinary shares but of deeply subordinated debt securities (non-innovative
hybrid instruments). There were several reasons for this decision. The main
reason is that French banks were not insolvent or close to bankruptcy, except
Dexia, or in a comparable situation to the one existing in some other countries.
Their solvency ratio, including Dexia, was above the regulatory require-
ments51. Therefore a capital injection in the form of ordinary shares was not
required. On the contrary, it would have sent to the financial markets the
message that the situation was worse than previously disclosed52. Another
50 The decision to announce details of the plan was accelerated by the decision of the
Dutch authorities on October 19, 2008 to provide 10 billion euros to ING, which
created an expectation on the markets for similar capital injections in other countries.
51 As of 30 June 2008, the Tier 1 solvency ratio were 8,3 % for Crédit Agricole, 7,6 % for
BNP Paribas, 8,2 % for Société Générale, 9,7 % for Crédit Mutuel, 8,3 % for Caisse
d’épargne and 9,6 % for Banque Populaire. See. Cour des comptes, Rapport public, Les
concours publics aux établissements de crédit : premiers constats, premières Recom-
mandations, June 2009, p. 56.
52 Hearing C. Lagarde, 5 nov. 2008, Rapport d’information déposé en application de
l’article 145 du Règlement par la Commission des finances, de l’Economie générale et du
Pierre-Henri Conac ECFR 2/2010310
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
reason is that the cost of issuing ordinary shares would have been more costly
for banks than issuing hybrid instruments. The Government chose not to issue
preferred shares either because, following negotiations with the Commission,
interest on preference shares was set at a higher rate (10 %) than on hybrid
securities53. This was logical since the more the instrument was close to equity,
indicating a distressed situation, the more the cost should be. Preference shares
are also less used in France by banks which issue rather TSS. Therefore, the
French financial rescue plan differed from the German, British and Greek
plans which included capital injections in the form of preferred or ordinary
shares.
The first tranche of deeply subordinated debt securities (Titres super
subordonnés à durée indéterminée or TSS), a financial instrument created in
200354, was issued on 11 december 2008, after the French plan was approved
by the EU Commission on 8 December 2008, to the six most important
French banking groups55. The TSS can be classified as non-core Tier 1 capital,
after agreement from the Banking Commission, if three conditions are
satisfied. They must be perpetual (or have a duration of 99 years), and can only
be reimbursed in limited circumstances if they are replaced with capital of the
same quality, unless the supervisor determines that there is adequate capital.
The issuer can cancel the payment of the dividend in times of stress and the
cancelled payment will be not accrued. Finally, they must have the capacity to
absorb losses during liquidation and as a going concern by reducing their
nominal value. In summary, they must be equivalent to equity.
This lead to an increase of each bank Tier 1 ratio by 0,5 % (50 basis points)
from around 8 % to around 8,5 %. Eligible institutions were financial
institutions (organismes financiers) which include credit institutions and other
types of regulated entities such as portfolio management companies. The
banks who took the funds were BNP Paribas (2,55 billion euros), Société
Générale (1,7 billion euros), Crédit Agricole (3 billion euros), Crédit Mutuel
(1,2 billion euros), Groupe Caisses d’épargne (1,1 billion euros), and Groupe
Banques Populaires (0,95 billion euros). Like in other countries like Germany
(Deutsche bank) or Italy (Banca Intesa), some banks such as Société Générale,
plan relatif à la crise financière internationale et présenté par MM Didier Migaud,
Président et Gilles Carrez, rapporteur général, Assemblée Nationale, n8 1235,
Enregistré à la Présidence de l’Assemblée nationale le 5 novembre 2008. p. 288. The
report is available at http://www.assemblee-nationale.fr/13/rap-info/i1235.asp.
53 Art. L.228-11 Commercial code. On the regime of preferred shares, see P-H Conac, The
New French Preferred Shares: Moving towards a More Liberal Approach, ECFR 4/
2005, p. 488.
54 Article L. 228-97 Commercial code. Law n82003-706, 1 août 2003, loi de sécurité
financière (LSF), art. 61, p. 1947, JO 2 August 2003, p. 13220.
55 State aid N 613/2008 – Republic of France. Capital-injection scheme for banks.
Brussels, 8.12.2008.
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stated publicly that they were reluctant to accept the capital injection.
However, in France they all finally accepted. It cannot be ruled out that there
was some political pressure on the reluctant banks to accept to participate in
the scheme. By forcing all major French banks to participate into the scheme,
the Government prevented the market from identifying a weaker one and
creating a panic like what had happened before to Fortis and Dexia in Europe,
or Bear Stearn and Lehman in the US.
The issues could be subscribed quickly since there was no need for an
extraordinary shareholders’ meeting of the banks since under French
company law, these instruments are treated as debt, which under French
company law can be issued by the board of directors of the company without
shareholders authorisation.
At the same time, in November 2008, the French Banking Commission
softened its approach and allowed hybrid capital to represent 35 % of the Tier
1 ratio in order to allow the banks to take full benefit of the financial rescue
plan56. This allowed the banks to take full benefit of the SPPE plan since some
of them had already reached the 25 % threshold established in 2004. The
Directive of 16 September 2009, which modified the 2006/48 capital adequacy
directive has also introduced a 35 % threshold and includes the possibility,
which corresponds also to the approach adopted in France, to raise the ratio of
hybrid capital in time of crisis57.
The interest rate on the TSS was set up around 8,2 % which was equivalent to
the interest rate on the 5 years State bonds (BTAN), which was around 4 % at
the time, five times the CDS of the bank, which lead to around 2 %, plus a 2 %
additional interest. This amount was similar to what banks where paying at the
beginning of 2008, before the financial crisis. The remuneration would be
fixed rate during five years and would become variable after March 11, 201458.
Repurchase of the TSS could be requested at any moment by the issuer, with
the agreement of the Banking commission and the purchaser. Following the
EU Commission guidelines which requested a strong incentive to reimburse
the State, so that State aid remain temporary, the interest increased every year
(step-up). The nominal amount to be redeemed would increase by 1 % if
reimbursement took place between 1 and 2 years of issuance, 3 % between 2
56 See, Cour des comptes, Rapport public, Les concours publics aux établissements de
crédit : premiers constats, premières Recommandations, June 2009, p. 19 available at :
http://www.ccomptes.fr/fr/CC/Publications-RPT.html
57 Art. 66§4 of the 2006/48 CRD directive as amended. Directive 2009/111/EC of the
European Parliament and of the Council of 16 September 2009 amending Directives
2006/48/EC, 2006/49/EC and 2007/64/EC as regards banks affiliated to central
institutions, certain own funds items, large exposures, supervisory arrangements, and
crisis management, OJ L 302, p. 97.
58 The variable rate would be EURIBOR + 250bps + 5 x CDS (senior five years).
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and 3 years, 5 % between 3 and 4 years, 7 % between 4 and 5 years, 9 %
between 5 and 6 years and 11 % beyond. Such interest rates provided a strong
incentive to pay back the TSS in the short term.
Since the financial crisis did not abate, the State announced on 21 January 2009
a second recapitalisation designed to increase French banks Tier 1 ratio by
another 0,5 %. The EU Commission had authorised a 21 billion euros scheme,
so that a second recapitalisation round was possible59. However a second
authorisation was necessary since preference shares were considered60. Since
most banks had already reached the maximum 35 % of Tier 1 threshold, it was
decided that banks would be offered either hybrid capital, on the same terms as
those approved in the decision of 8 December 2008, and preference shares,
which, under certain conditions can be classified as Core Tier 1 capital. By
allowing preference shares, not only would the capital injection increase the
Core Tier 1 ratio but it would also allow mechanically more TSS to be
included in the Tier 1 ratio since the amount of Core Tier 1 capital would
increase. A 2008 modification of the legal regime of preferred shares made this
operation possible for banking regulators. Before the 2008 Act of modernisa-
tion of the Economy (LME Act)61, listed preferred shares could be reimbursed
at the request of a shareholder in case of the market was illiquid. Therefore, the
Banking commission had then refused to include such assets into the Core
Tier 1 category. This provision was abrogated by the LME Act which allowed
the Banking commission to decide in February 2009 that preferred shares
could be included in the Core Tier 1 ratio. The program was of an amount of
11 billion euros. Eligible banks also had the possibility to convert previously
issued TSS into preferred shares in order to increase in their Core Tier 1
capital.
Preferred shares issued under the plan were non voting shares not convertible
into ordinary shares. Negotiations with the Commission led to the establish-
ment of a higher remuneration for preference shares, compared to the TSS,
reflecting their higher degree of risk. In addition, the cost was also higher for
the banks since the payments on the preferred shares were not tax deductible.
However, payment to the State was only allowed if a dividend was paid to the
shareholders. In order for the preferred shares to be accepted as Core Tier 1,
only the issuer could decide to reimburse the shares. Like with the TSS, the
59 The EU Commission also accepted (28 January 2009) to increase the autorisation by E
500 M in order to take into account the merger of the Caisses d’Epargne and the Banques
Populaires available at : http://ec.europa.eu/community_law/state_aids/comp-2009/
n249-09.pdf
60 State aid N 29/2009 – French Republic Amendment to the capital-injection scheme for
banks, Brussels, 28.1.2009.
61 Art. 31, abrogating article L. 228-20 of the Commercial code, of the Law no 2008-776 of
4 August 2008 of modernisation of the economy, JO 5 August 2008, p. 12471.
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preferred shares included step-up provisions in order to create an incentive for
repayment. The maximum repurchase price was regularly increased but
capped at 20 % after the first 5 years and 60 % after 13 years. The limitation of
capital gains for the State was the counterparty of the increased interest on
preferred shares.
The French State did not request to be represented on the board of directors of
the banks, except in the case of Dexia and of the new BPCE group resulting
from the merger of Groupe Caisses d’épargne and the Groupe Banques
Populaires. The presence of representatives of the State at the level of BPCE
was probably caused by the fact that the previous cooperation between the
two companies had been contentious, and that Natixis was a subsidiary of the
new group. Apart from the BPCE, the main reason is that preferred shares
issued by the banks did not give voting rights. However, no legal provision
prohibits holders of non voting preferred shares to be elected to the board of
director or to the supervisory board. In addition, since the 2008 LME Act, it is
not even necessary any longer for a director or a member of a supervisory
board to be a shareholder, preferred or non preferred, except if provided for
the contrary by the articles of association62.
The option was open until 30 August 2009 because under French company
law, banks need a special authorisation from the extraordinary general
shareholders’ meeting to increase capital for the benefit of one identified
person. Therefore, the board of directors alone could not issue the preferred
shares to the SPPE. Not all French banks subscribed to this second tranche.
The subscribers were Société Générale (1,7 billion euros) with preferred
shares, BNP Paribas with preferred shares (5,1 billion euros), Caisses
d’épargne (1,1 billion euros) and Banque Populaire (0,95 billion euros).
Crédit agricole and Crédit mutuel did not subscribe to the second tranche.
Because they were costly and temporary, most French banks, like in the US
and the UK reimbursed the TSS and the preferred shares very quickly. This
took place between October and November 2009, especially through share
increases in order to pay back the TSS and the preferred shares. As of
December 2009, E13,5 billion had been paid back to the French State, and all
French banks, except the new BPCE group had reimbursed the French State.
A second aspect of the French financial rescue scheme, in line with other
countries, was the refinancing of the banks.
62 Art. L. 225-25 (board of directors) and L. 225-72 (supervisory board) Commercial code.
See B. Saintourens, Les réformes du droit des sociétés par la loi du 4 août 2008 de
modernisation de l’économie, Revue des sociétés, Dalloz 2008, p. 477.
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28) Refinancing of the banking sector
Like other countries, the French Government did not want just to improve the
solvency of French banks but also to make their assets more liquid so that they
could have funds to lend to businesses. Therefore, the State needed to
substitute itself to private markets. This was done through the creation of a
company, the Company for the financing of the French economy (Société de
Financement de l’Économie Française or SFEF). This approach was unique in
Europe because many other States (Germany, UK, Belgium) chose to
guarantee directly debt issuances of their banks. The reason might be that,
apart from Dexia and Natixis, there were not officially specific ailing banks.
The decision to create a special entity was due to clarity reasons, in order to
distinguish State debt from debt issued for the benefit of the banking sector. It
was also a way to underline that the SFEF was a non-recurring debtor,
contrary for instance to the German Kreditanstalt für Wiederaufbau (Kfw),
which was considered to have a positive effect on possible lenders. The SFEF
is a joint-stock company (Société anonyme) held by the six major banks and
HSBC France (66 %) with a blocking minority for the French State (34 %)63.
Michel Camdessus, former International Monetary Fund (IMF) chairman,
was appointed as chair. The French State was granted two representatives on
the board of directors and there is a veto right for the Ministry for Economy
on any decision of the board of directors which could affect the interests of the
French State.
The decision to create a special entity majoritarily-owned by the private sector
was also due to a willingness to avoid the inclusion of the large amount of debt
issued by the SFEF into the French public debt. Despite the fact that the
company was majority owned by the private sector, Eurostat considered at
first that the SFEF was a public institution and therefore that the debt was to
be accounted as State debt according to the Maastricht standards. However, in
July 2009, after apparently strong pressure from France and in order to
provide a level playing field with European States which had provided direct
guarantees to banks and whose guarantees were not included in their debt,
Eurostat excluded the amount of debt issued by the SFEF from the French
national debt. This lowered the French debt by around 4 %.
The SFEF was not given credit institution (établissement de crédit) status in
order to avoid the application of the Basel solvency ratio which would have
implied for its shareholders bringing around 750 million euros of capital.
Therefore, the capital could be limited to 50 million euros. Although not
legally a bank, the SFEF was granted an exception to the banking monopoly
and is subject to the supervision of the Banking Commission. Therefore, the
63 Art. L. 225 – 96 Commercial code.
Mastering the financial crisis – The French approachECFR 2/2010 315
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
Chairman of the French Central Bank, who is also the chairman of the
Banking commission, attends the meeting of the board. The SFEF was also
granted the right to issue immediately bonds, whereas under the Commercial
Code, joint-stock companies have normally to wait 2 years64.
Under the Law for finance of 16 October 2008, the SFEF was allowed to issue
bonds which would be guaranteed by the French State, up to 265 billion
euros65, including 55 billion euros for companies of the Dexia group and bonds
issued by the SPPE. Contrary to the SPPE, the guarantee of the State was
charged to the SFEF which transferred the cost to the borrowing banks. This
amount was close to 17 % of the France Gross National Product, and was
comparable to plans adopted in the UK and Germany. The State guarantee on
debt issued by the SFEF, making it AAA rated, was given on a case by case by
the Ministry of the Economy and provides the highest level of security since
the guarantee is autonomous, on first request, unconditional and irrevocable.
The 265 billion euros level was very high in oder to reassure the markets but
was not meant to be really raised. The SFEF had only issued 50 billion euros in
April 2009 and stopped issuing bonds at the end of September 2009. Despite
this guarantee, the SFEF bonds had to be priced at 0,5 % more than bonds
issued directly by the French State, because it was still a private issuer.
The refinancing scheme for credit institutions in France was initially approved
by the Commission on 30 October 200866. Its extension was authorised on 12
May 200967. The two constraints from the EU Commission were that the
guarantee should be paid by the banks at market price and that the plan should
be temporary with issuances until the end of 2009 and bonds having no more
than a 5 years maturity. Regarding the price of the guarantee, the ECB
recommendation of October 20, 2008 requested an interest rate of 0,5 %
above the cost of refinancing for the State, which could be reduced to 0,2 % in
case of posting of collateral by the banks. The loans from the SFEF required
collateral so that the cost of the operation to the eligible banks could be
reduced. The collateral accepted were more flexible than the ones accepted by
the ECB but were still of high level. They included investment grade assets
such as mortgage loans, real estate loans guaranteed by a bond issued by a
highly rated financial institution, loans to municipalities and local authorities,
consumer loans to French residents, loans to highly rated companies…
64 Art. L. 228-39 Commercial code.
65 The original amount provided for in the law for finance was 360 billion euros, but the
Commission reduced it to 320 billion euros, by reducing the amount that the SPPE
could raise from 40 to 21 billion euros.
66 Sate aid No N 548/08 France – Financial support measures to the banking industry in
France.
67 State Aid No N 251/09 France – Financial support measures to the banking industry in
France
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Quality of the collateral is monitored by the French central bank. The SFEF
also benefits for its loans and for the collateral attached of close-out netting
provision of the Collateral Directive68. This scheme was unique in Europe and
reflected the better financial situation of most French financial institutions69.
Eligible institutions were not just the seven banks who were shareholders of
the SFEF but are all « credit institutions » licensed and supervised under the
conditions defined by the French Monetary and Financial Code, and which
comply at the time the request is made with capital adequacy requirements,
and have signed an agreement with the State on corporate governance and
extension of credit to certain individuals. Like with the SPPE, the SFEF
mechanism was only open to financial institutions who satisfied the Basel
sovency ratio. The scheme was open to subsidiaries of foreign groups. The
facility was used by six of the major bank shareholders, except HSBC France,
and consumer oriented financial institutions, especially financial arms of
automobile builders70. The beneficiary banks represented 80 % of the
outstanding loans to the economy.
The SFEF stopped its activities in October 2009 since French banks could
refinance themselves on the market. As a whole, the SFEF issued debt for an
amount of 77 billion euros. In addition to this general financial rescue scheme,
specific rescue measures were also adopted.
B. Specific rescue measures
The French State had to take specific measures for two banks in a difficult
situation (18), but this situation did not go so far as a nationalisation of the
banks (28).
18) Banks concerned by specific measures
The banks concerned by specific measures were Dexia group (a) and Natixis
(b). In addition, in case Dexia or another bank would needed funds in an
emergency situation, the 16 October 2008 Act allowed the Ministry for the
68 Art L. 431-7 Monetary and Financial Code.
69 See, Cour des comptes, Rapport public, Les concours publics aux établissements de
crédit : premiers constats, premières Recommandations, June 2009, p. 73.
70 These institutions are SA Finance (PSA-Peugeot-Citroën), General Electric, le Crédit
immobilier, Laser Cofinoga, RCI banque (groupe Renault), S2Pass (groupe Carrefour)
et VFS Finance (groupe Volvo). See, Cour des comptes, Rapport public, Les concours
publics aux établissements de crédit : premiers constats, premières Recommandations,
June 2009, p. 32.
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Economy to grant directly ad hoc guarantee to the financial instruments issued
by « credit institutions » (only) before 31 December 2009 and for a maximum
duration of 5 years. The guarantee was subject to the same requirement of
collateral as for loans from the SFFE.
a) The case of Dexia
The Dexia group was created in 1996 by the merger of a Belgian retail bank
(Crédit communal de Belgique), which also included a Luxembourg
subsidiary (Banque Internationale à Luxembourg or BIL), and a French
bank without a deposit base and specialising in loans to municipalities (Crédit
Local de France or CLF). It was decided in 1999 that the holding company
would be incorporated in Belgium. It was supervised by the Belgian financial
regulator (Commission bancaire, financière et des assurances or CBFA) with a
college including the French and Luxembourg supervisors. The CLF was a
former subsidiary of a major State-owned financial institution the Caisses des
dépôts et consignations (CDC) and had been listed on the Paris Stock
Exchange in 1991. Therefore, Dexia included a large French shareholder base
and a large French activity.
The financial difficulties of Dexia originated mainly from a US subsidiary,
Financial Security Assurance (FSA), which had been bought by the French
based Dexia Crédit Local in 2000. The activity of FSA was to provide
insurance against default for bonds issued by american municipalities. Since
Dexia had a AAA rating, this allowed american municipalities to reduce their
borrowing cost by benefiting from the FSA rating. This was consistent with
providing services to municipalities.
However, FSA also expanded its activities and guaranteed not only
municipalities but also asset-backed securities (ABS) essentially in pooled
corporate, consumer loans and residential mortgage-backed securities. As of
31 December 2006, Dexia had through FSA a net par exposure of 135 billion
dollars to ABS71 and 425 billion dollars as at 30 September 2008. Despite
believing to be extremely conservative by insuring a majority of at least A
rated assets, FSA was hit when the real estate market deteriorated in the
United States. FSA also had to pay claims on its HELOC (Home Equity Lines
of Credit) portfolio. However, Dexia was faced with significant liquidity risk
since some contracts could be terminated in advance in particular case or if the
credit rating of FSA fell below certain levels which would trigger in both cases
requirements for collateral. Therefore, Dexia had to provide a line of financing
of 5 billion dollars to FSA in 2008 in order to protect its credit rating. Despite
this measures, shares of the company regularly decreased in value and
problems became more acute when the market realised the danger posed by
71 Dexia annual report 2006, p. 64.
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FSA. Another weakness was that Dexia Crédit Local was highly dependent on
markets to refinance itself, making it very vulnerable to a loss of confidence.
The Fortis bail-out was followed a few days later by a Dexia bail-out. On
Monday 29, 2008, the non-guaranteed interbank market was closed to Dexia
which had to resort to the ECB’s discount window for liquidity. Standard and
Poor downgraded Dexia debt. The cost for insuring dexia debt through CDS
increased. The share lost nearly 30 % of its value in one day. Finally, private
and institutional depositors started to withdraw funds in Luxembourg and
Belgium, starting a bank run. Management decided that they needed an equity
injection in order to reassure the markets. On 30 September 2008, a plan was
announced in order to recapitalise Dexia through a reserved capital increase of
6 billion euros. France decided to support Dexia since it is the most important
lender to French local authorities. The CDC brought 2 billion euros in capital,
including 0,29 billion euros through its subsidiary CNP, and the French State
through the SPPE, 1 billion euros72, since the CDC did not want to support all
the cost of the capital increase. The Belgian State and regions provided 3
billion euros, and the Luxembourg Government provided 0,4 billion euros in
convertible bonds directly to the Luxembourg subsidiary.
The capital increase could be decided quickly because, under Belgian
company law, the board of directors can, if this is allowed by the articles of
incorporation, increase the capital up to the authorised capital73. In addition,
the pre-emptive rights of existing shareholders can be removed for issuance of
shares decided by the board of directors within the authorized capital, if the
statutes of the company provide so74. This possibility was provided for in the
Dexia statutes. The price of the newly issued shares was 9,9 euros which was
substantially above the then market price. This situation was due to the fact
that under Belgian company law, in order to protect minority shareholders,
the issue price for new shares without pre-emption rights in favor of one or
more specific persons, must be, when the company is listed, at least equal to
the average closing price of the company shares over the 30 calendar days
preceding the day of the launch of the issue75. Since the share was quickly
losing in value, the market price at the time of the capital increase was
substantially lower than the average. As a result of the capital increase, France
received a blocking minority, which is set at 25 % under Belgian company
law76.
72 The SPPE had been established before the Law of 16 October 2008 for finance.
73 Art. 603 Belgian company code. The authorised capital cannot be more than the amount
of the existing capital.
74 Art. 605 Belgian company code.
75 Art. 598 Belgian company code.
76 Art. 558 Belgian company code.
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In exchange for this recapitalisation, the French government demanded a
change in the institution’s direction. The Belgian CEO and the French
Chairman of the board had to step down and were replaced by a former
French civil servant and a Belgian politician. France also demanded success-
fully that the CEO would not receive his golden parachute. These conditions
reflected the general position of France on recapitalisation. The French State
also requested seats at the board of directors, which was normal since it
became a large shareholder. Finally, the new management had to present a
restructuration plan.
Despite these strong measures, confidence did not return and Dexia was still
facing difficulties to refinance itself on the market and Dexia lost access to
short- or long-term financing on the interbank or capital markets. Therefore, a
second plan was adopted, one week later, on 9 October 2008. The French
Belgian and Luxembourg government issued a joint and non several guarantee
on debts issued up to 150 billion euros by Dexia, and Dexia subsidiaries.
Eligible liabilities were bonds and debt securities issued by companies of the
Dexia group to credit institutions and institutional counterparties raised
between 9 October 2008 and 31 October 2009 and maturing before 31
October 2011. Therefore, the guarantee covered medium term financing. The
guarantee was used to a maximum amount of 95,87 billion euros as to 27 May
2009 and still covered 45,73 billion euros guarantee as to 31 March 2010. The
amount was reduced by the EU Commission to 100 billion euros in
November 2009 and the duration of the scheme to June 2010. Those schemes
were approved by the Commission under article 107(3)(b) since the failure of
Dexia would have create a serious disturbance in the Belgian economy77.
Finally, on 14 november 2008, a guarantee on 16,9 billion dollars of “toxic”
assets held in a “Financial Products portfolio” of Financial Security Assurance
(FSA) was provided by the French (38 %) and Belgian (62 %) States. The
guarantee is an autonomous first demand, irrevocable and unconditional
guarantee. FSA was sold in July 2009 to Assured Guarantee for a loss,
following an agreement on 14 November 2008, but the “Financial Products
portfolio” remained with Dexia and has been managed since in run-off mode.
The guarantee was necessary in order to allow Dexia to sell FSA to a
purchaser. Dexia had to pay for the guarantee following the ECB guidelines.
Under the agreement Dexia covers losses up to 4,5 billion dollars on one part
(the highest grade) of the portfolio (“excluded assets”). This was necessary
since, according to the Impaired Assets Communication, there must be
burden-sharing of the costs between the State and the bank. On the other part
of the portfolio, States provide a guarantee and will be entitled to cash, for a
77 State aid NN 49/2008 – Belgium, NN 50/2008 – France, NN 45/2008 – Luxembourg
Emergency aid to Dexia in the form of a guarantee for bonds and liquidity assistance,
Brussels, 19 November 2008.
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first tranche, and for the second tranche to ordinary shares of Dexia78. This
mechanism had to be submitted for approval to a Dexia extraordinary
shareholders’ meeting since it implied an increase of capital through warrants
and issuance of shares paid by a contribution in kind (necessary action against
Dexia)79.
Under the restructuring plan, approved by the Commission in March 201080,
Dexia has to focus on its core banking activities and its traditional markets –
Belgium, France and Luxembourg. Dexia is also obliged to make a sufficient
own contribution to the restructuring costs by suspending, for two years, cash
dividend payments on equities and interest payments on instruments
constituting own funds.
The other case in which the French Government was involved, although more
indirectly, was the case of Natixis.
b. The case of Natixis
The other large casualty in France of the banking crisis was Natixis, and
indirectly its two controlling shareholders, the Caisses d’épargne Group and
the Banque Populaires Group. Natixis was created in 2006 by the merger of an
investment bank, IXIS Corporate & Investment Bank, and Natexis Banques
Populaires, which was more a commercial bank. IXIS Corporate & Invest-
ment Bank had originally been created in 2000, as a fully-owned subsidiary of
the CDC which was under pressure from the Commission to separate its
private sector activities from public interest activities. In 2004, IXIS was then
sold to the Groupe Caisses d’épargne, which entered in 2006 into a strategic
alliance with Groupe Banques Populaires. Natixis was soon after subject to an
IPO which attracted 2,8 millions shareholders at a price of 19,55 euros. Both
groups kept 71,3 % of the capital of their joint subsidiary.
Natixis was a cause of problems for its parent companies for two reasons.
First, IXIS Corporate & Investment Bank had established in 2001 a monoline
insurer in the United States, Compagnie Ixis Financial Guaranty (CIFG),
which first guaranteed municipal debt, but started in 2004, similarly to Dexia
78 States are entitled to cash up to 4,5 billion euros, and for the rest in ordinary shares.
However losses on the « excluded assets » count towards the 4,5 billion euros amount of
the first “tranche” for which the States benefit from a direct cash recourse against Dexia.
79 State aid C 9/2009 (ex NN 49/2008) – Belgium. C 9/2009 (ex NN 50/2008) – France C 9/
2009 (ex NN 45/2008) – Luxembourg. Aid to Dexia in the form of guarantees for bonds
and certain assets, liquidity assistance and a capital increase, Brussels, 13 March 2009.
80 State aid C 9/2009 (ex NN 49/2008) – Belgium, C 9/2009 (ex NN 50/2008) – France, C
9/2009 (ex NN 45/2008) – Luxembourg. Aid to Dexia in the form of guarantees for
bonds and certain assets, liquidity assistance and a capital increase. Brussels, 13 March
2009.
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owned FSA, to diversify into guarantee of structured products and subprime.
When the financial crisis started in August 2007, CIFG found itself exposed
up to a level of 90 billion dollars, after having increased its bets against 35
billion dollars one year sooner, and had to be sold in December 2007 in a fire
sale for 2 euros to its two parent companies, which then injected 1,5 billion
dollars into CIFG. In 2009, Groupe Caisses d’épargne and Groupe Banques
Populaires had to pay another 1,4 billion euros and transfer 90 % of CIFG to
holders of guarantees issued by CIFG. As a whole, CIFG costed 3,5 billion
euros to its two controlling shareholders.
Second, as an investment bank, with a large presence in New York, Natixis,
was a major actor in the subprime market. When the financial crisis started,
instead of reducing its exposure, Natixis increased its bets. The New York
activities, which had been so far highly profitable, were apparently not subject
to a strict control and they were tensions between the two majority
shareholders as to who would control the potential group to be formed. In
addition, managers in Paris felt that the crisis was only temporary. However,
the situation deteriorated and a 3,7 billion euros capital increase had to be
announced in July 2008. However, the bank had to wait three months since it
had to call an ad hoc extraordinary shareholders’ meeting. It could proceed
with its share increase only in September 2008 at a deep discount. In December
2008, of the 2,05 billlion euros received by Groupe Caisses d’épargne and
Groupe Banques Populaires from the SPPE in the form of TSS issuance, 1,9
billion euros went directly to Natixis.
On October 2008, under request from the French Government, the two
parent companies decided to merge. The merger became effective in June 2009
through an Act which was necessary since the provisions applicable to each
group were located in the legislative part of the Monetary and Financial Code.
On October 17, 2008, a trading loss from unauthorized position for an amount
of 0,75 billion euros was disclosed and, after the Government requested
sanctions, the chairman of Groupe Caisses d’épargne was forced to resign by
his board. A new chairman for both groups, close to the French presidency,
was appointed by both board in February 2009.
In May 2009, the French State injected through the SPPE 2 billion euros in TSS
in the merged group and 3 billion euros in preferred shares. Like for the other
banks, after 5 years, in 2014, the non-voting preferred shares will be
convertible into ordinary shares through warrants, which is an incentive for
the bank to pay back the shares since otherwise the French Government
would have held 20 % of the capital. As with the other preferred shares and
TSS subscribed by the SPPE, in order to create an incentive for repayment, the
remuneration and the nominal amount to be repaid increase with time.
Although not a shareholder, the State also received a veto right at the board
level on strategic decisions through the requirement of a qualified majority
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which cannot be reached without the vote of some of the State appointed
directors.
Natixis did not receive State aids as such and therefore did not need an
authorisation from the EU Commission. State aids were provided to Groupe
Caisses d’épargne and Groupe Banques Populaires through the SPPE and the
SFEF.
Contrary to the situation in Germany or the United Kingdom, France did not
had to nationalise partly or fully its banks. Under French law, a full
nationalisation of a bank facing difficulties or filing for bankruptcy would
have faced several difficulties.
28) Legal issues attached to nationalisation
The French government would have faced legal issue if it had attempted to
acquire control of a systemic bank, facing the prospect of insolvency, through
expropriation (a) or without expropriation (b).
a) Acquiring control through expropriation
First, shareholders are entitled in France, like in other European countries, to a
protection of their property rights which means that the State has to show a
« public interest » in order to be able to expropriate them.
Under the European Convention for the protection of Human Rights and
Fundamental Freedoms of 4 November 1950, and more specifically Article 1
of the First Additional Protocol, property is protected. According to
European Court for Human Rights (ECHR) case law, a share in a company
is considered to be a property of the shareholder81. However, the issue of State
interference in order to solve a bank difficulties was raised before the ECHR
in a case where the participation of a shareholder in a failing bank was reduced
from 45 % to 0,4 %82. In this case, the ECHR recognized that there was a
balance between the shareholders’ property rights and public interest
objectives so that the reduction of the participation could be accepted. The
Court also granted a wide margin of appreciation to the States as to the amount
of compensation to be given to the shareholders and the method for valuing
shares
Under French law, property is also protected by the Constitution and
deprivation of property is only allowed when « public necessity, legally
ascertained, obviously requires it, and just and prior indemnity has been
81 Sovtransavto Holdings v. Ukraine, n848553/99, ECHR 2002-VII, 25 July 2002.
82 Olczak v. Poland, n830417/96, ECHR 2002-X, 7 November 2002.
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paid »83. Protection of property is also assured by the Civil code84. A decision
of the French Constitutionnal Council (Conseil constitutionnel), issued in the
context of the 1981 nationalisation, confirmed that property included shares85.
There is no law in France allowing for a nationalisation of a systemic
important bank such as the German Rescue Takeover Act (Gesetz zur Rettung
von Unternehmen zur Stabililisierung des Finanzmarktes). Therefore, the
issue of whether such a law would satisfy the « public necessity » requirement
has not been tested in France. However, it is unlikely that the French
constitutional court (Conseil constitutionnel) or the judicial courts, as to the
First Additional Protocol, would not validate an expropriation scheme for
systemically important banks.
b) Acquiring control without expropriation
In the absence of an ad hoc legislation, the French State would face practical
difficulties to take full control of a bank or to change significantly its
ownership, unless it is already under administrative or judicial administration,
which might then be to late to restructure it, like the experience of Lehman
Brothers shows when it filed for Chapter 11 protection in the US. There are
three different possible situations. The bank can still be solvent, can be under
provisional administration, or has filed for bankruptcy.
If the French State wants to take full control of a bank which is not placed
under administrative or judicial administration, it does not have any specific
squeeze-out right. Therefore, it must launch a takeover and reach a threshold
of 95 % of the capital or the voting rights before being able to squeeze out
minority shareholders86. However, there is no guarantee to succeed, especially
if there is a reluctant majority or even minority shareholder. In addition, in the
case of a non-listed bank, this method is not available.
In the case of an ailing bank, the Banking Commission can appoint a
provisional administrator (administration provisoire)87. However, like in
other EU countries, a special administrator cannot undertake a quick
recapitalization of a credit institution without an extraordinary general
shareholders’ meeting (unless a prior authorisation). The reason is that the
European Union Court of Justice ruled in 1996 that the Second Directive
applies also to bank restructuring measures when the bank is a joint-stock
83 Article 17 of the Declaration on Human and Civic rights of 26 August 1789.
84 Art. 545 Civil code : « No one may be compelled to yield his ownership, unless for
public purposes and for a fair and previous indemnity ».
85 Decision n881-132 DC of January 1982 and n882-139 DC of February 1982 of the
French Constitutional Council.
86 Art. L. 433 – 4 Monetary and Financial Code.
87 Article L. 612– 34 Monetary and Financial code.
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company88. In this case, a temporary administrator appointed by the Bank of
Greece had decided an increase of capital without shareholders approval and
without respecting their pre-emption right. The ECJ precludes an admin-
istrative body such as the ACP in France from deciding alone a recapital-
isation of a bank. However, if the State can gain a majority of the votes at the
meeting, the French highest judiciary court, the Cour de cassation, has been
rather liberal in allowing recapitalisation decided by shareholders through a
capital increase even if it resulted in the former minority shareholders being
wiped out89.
Finally, in the case of a bank which has filed for bankruptcy, the 2001 Banks’
Winding-up Directive does not deal with the question of the effect of
reorganisation measures on shareholders and leaves this issue to Member
States90. In France, restructuring measures fall within the competence of the
judicial authorities, like for any commercial company and not of the Banking
Commission. The Banking commission can intervene at several stages of the
restructuring process but with no binding power. For instance, the judicial
reorganisation and liquidation cannot be initiated until the Banking Com-
mission opinion has been obtained91.
III. Regulations imposed on banks
The objective of the French financial rescue plan was that banks extend loans
in order to prevent a credit crunch. Therefore, the main counterparty to the
French financial rescue plan was that banks increase financing of the real
economy (A). The other counterparty was a limitation on managers and
traders compensation (B). However, like in other European countries, the
French reaction to the crisis also included several measures in these areas
which were not the counterpart of the rescue plan.
88 ECJ, Panaganis Pafitis and Others v. Trapeza Kenkritis Ellados A.E. and Others, C-
441/93, 1996, ECR-I-1347.
89 For an exemple, see. S. Sylvestre, De la légitimité d’un coup d’accordéon eu égard aux
intérêts des actionnaires et de la personne morale, Bulletin Joly Sociétés, 01 juin 2005 n8
6, p. 701.
90 Directive of the European Parliament and of the Council on the Reorganisation and
winding-up of Credit Institutions of 4 April 2001, OJ L 125/15, 05/05/2001.
91 Article L. 613-27 Monetary and Financial code.
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A. Financing by the banks
France adopted several measures in order to help finance the economy (18).
The obligations accepted by the bank as part of the financial rescue scheme
were subject to controlling mechanisms (28).
18) The measures adopted by the French State in order to help finance the
economy
Some measures were the counterpart of the financial rescue plan (a) while
others were not (b).
a. The measures which were the counterpart of the financial rescue plan
The law on finance of October 16, 2008 included a provision according to
which credit institutions who had received financing from the SFEF should
sign a convention regarding the financing of individuals (consumer loans and
mortgage), companies and local authorities. The convention was not signed
with the SFEF but directly with the French State. The convention included
provisions according to which the State could sanction the credit institutions
in case they would not have fulfilled their commitment. The obligation of
credit institutions was to increase from 3 to 4 % (on an annual basis) their
loans to business and individuals92. The increase in loans at the time of the Act
was around 8 %. The 13 credit institutions who received funding from the
SFEF represented 83,5 % of the loans to the economy. Therefore, the plan had
a wide coverage. This commitment was not fully respected but the banks were
not to blame for this. The reason is that the commitment had been accepted on
the assumption of a an increase in the GDP of 1,3 % and inflation of 2 %.
Instead, in 2009, the French GDP shrank by 2,25 % and inflation was only
0,1 %. The final increase in loans in 2009 was 2,7 %.
In addition, a separate convention between the SFEF, the State and five French
banks (BNP Paribas, Société Générale, Crédit Agricole Groupe Banques
Populaires and Groupe Caisses d’Epargne) was signed in April 2009 so that
banks would provide funds for exportation up to 7 billion euros.
b. The measures who were not the counterpart of the financial rescue plan
The French government also adopted several economic rescue measures
unrelated to the plan. A first plan including a 22 billion euros financing for
92 This increase was equivalent to around 75 billion euros as of october 2008.
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small and medium enterprises (SMEs) was adopted on October 2, 200893. The
plan was due to the fact that the cost of financing for SMEs had increased in
comparison with larger companies. The spread went up to 200 basis point in
February 2009 instead of 50 –100 basis point since mid-2006. A second
Recovery Plan (plan de relance) was released on 4 December 2008 and
included a E 26 billion euros financing. A third plan was specific for the car
industry and included, for instance, an incitation to sell old cars (9 February
2009). These measures and others are not very different from those adopted in
other EU countries in order to boost the economy.
Other general measures included a reorientation of available funds. For
instance, the 4 August 2008 LME Act forced banks to use certain assets to
provide loans to SMEs. Another Act of 19 October 2009, created a duty for life
insurance companies to invest into SMEs94. In addition, in order to protect
SMEs from credit withdrawal, the law also requested that banks give a 60 days
notice in case of reduction or withdrawal of credit. Financial institutions are
also requested to disclose and explain, upon request, the reason for the
reduction or withdrawal of credit
After the Kerviel scandal in February 2008, there were also some fears in
France of a foreign hostile takeover on Société Générale. Therefore, there was
a political declaration that a foreign takeover on Société Générale would not
be allowed. There were then debates about turning the CDC into a French
Sovereign Wealth Fund in order to defend French listed companies against
potential takeovers. This fear lead the Government to set up a strategic
investment fund (Fonds stratégique d’investissement or FSI), which was
created in December 2008 as a joint-stock company, owned by the CDC and
the French State, managed by the CDC and monitored by the Parliament95.
The reason for creating the fund was to protect listed and non listed companies
experiencing difficulties from foreign « predators » and to help these
companies grow by taking minority stakes.
93 One part of the funding, E 16,7 billion euros, was attributed to the banks, while another
part, E 5 billion euros, went through OSEO, a French public body which finances and
supports small and medium-sized enterprises.
94 Law n82009-1255 of 19 Octobre 2009 to favor access to credit by SMEs and to improve
the functionning of financial markets, JO 20 oct. 2009, p. 17410.
95 The FSI was granted 20 billion euros, but only 6 billion euros in new money and the rest
by transfer of pre-existing assets. On the Fonds Stratégique d’Investissement, see.
www.fonds-fsi.fr
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28) Controlling mechanisms
Several controlling mechanisms were put in place in order to control the
implementation by credit institutions of their commitments. A parliamentary
oversight was organised (a), but the most original measure was the creation of
a Credit Mediator(b).
a. Parliamentary oversight
The Law on finance of October 16, 2008 included a provision according to
which the Government should report quarterly to the Parliament on the
implementation of the financial rescue plan. In addition, a committee
composed of two members of Parliament, the chair of the Central Bank and
two senior civil servants was created in December 2008 in order to supervise
the implementation of the financial rescue plan96.
b. The Credit Mediator
A Credit Mediator (Médiateur du crédit) was created in October 200897. The
goal of the mediator for credit is to prevent companies from going bankrupt in
case they experience difficulties with regard either to renegotiating conditions
for their commitments, or to refusals to provide loans or open cash lines. It was
also a mean to make sure that banks would respect their obligation to increase
the volume of loans to companies. On 27 July 2009, this system was reinforced
through the signing of a convention between the State, the Credit Mediator,
the French Central Bank and the credit institutions. This system has been very
successful and a large majority of cases submitted to the mediator have led to
an agreement among the parties.
The other major counterparty imposed and banks and regulation imposed on
them concerned compensation.
B. Limiting compensation
A major aspect of the French financial rescue plan has been the limitation of
bankers’ compensation in exchange for the support. These types of measures
were also adopted in the United States, in the United Kingdom and in
Germany. Some of these measures were linked to the financial rescue and are
96 Decree n8 2008-1287 of 10 december 2008 relatif à la création d’un comité de suivi du
dispositif de financement de l’économie française, JO 11 December 2008, p. 18844.
97 See. www.mediateurducredit.fr
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temporary (18). However, the French government also adopted measures
which are permanent (28).
18) Temporary provisions
Some temporary provisions on compensation concerned senior management
(a) while other were targeted at traders (b).
a. Temporary provisions on senior management compensation
Temporary provisions on compensation depend on the type of aid received
but where generally severe. The conditions attached to the recapitalisation
scheme were more stringent than for those attached to the refinancing scheme.
Specific provisions were also adopted for State-owned companies.
Regarding credit institutions helped by the SFEF, the Law on finance of
October 16, 2008 included a provision according to which credit institutions
which had received financing from the SFEF should sign a convention with
the State which would include « ethical obligations ». This provision was not
very precise but implied that banks should abide by the AFEP-MEDEF
Corporate governance code on executive compensation which had been
released on 6 October 200898. These principles apply to all companies whose
shares are listed on a French regulated market and already included listed
banks.
The AFEP-MEDEF code includes several important provisions. Firstly, a
senior executive should not benefit from an employment contract, so that in
case of dismissal for or without cause, he cannot be protected by labor law.
Secondly, several principles applied to stock-options. Stock-options should
be granted with a view to associate their beneficiaries in the long term and not
be an instant supplementary compensation, be subject to precise performance
conditions, must not be disproportionate in comparison to the fix compensa-
tion, must not be too much concentrated on the managers but also benefit
employees, must not be hedged by their beneficiaries, and must not be granted
when the price of the share is abnormally low. Third, any golden parachute
should be limited to two years of remuneration (fix and variable) and should
only be paid in case of forced departure and only if the manager has satisfied
performance criteria. Finally, the attribution of supplementary defined
benefits pensions (retraites chapeaux) to senior management should be
98 AFEP stands for Association Française des Entreprises Privées and is an association of
French private sector companies. The AFEP acts as a pro- business lobbying group.
MEDEF stands for Mouvement des Entreprises de France and is the oldest and most
important French business confederation.
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subject to conditions of seniority, and should be of a limited amount
compared to the fix part of the compensation99. The Convention signed by
banks receiving funds with the State included a provision regarding the respect
of these provisions.
The enforcement of these principles soon appeared insufficient and some of
them were turned into hard law. The immediate reason was that, on 20 March
2009, four top managers of the Société Générale were granted stock-options
by the board of directors. This immediately triggered heavy criticism from the
French Government. Société Générale had received public funds and support.
The strike price was deemed « abnormally» low (24 euros), given the general
drop in the price of banking shares, providing for a high probability of a very
large gain if the price of the stock was to reach even its pre-Lehman failure
level (60 euros). It was considered to be easy money at the cost of taxpayers.
The managers « voluntarily » gave up their stock-options grants. A few days
later, a decree of 30 march 2009 provided that credit institutions having
received long term financing by the SPPE, which included Dexia, should have
their conventions with the State modified in order to include several new
provisions and prohibit grant of stock-options100. In addition, another scandal
took place only one week later, when the CEO of a car supplier company
(Valeo) had to resign due to a strategic divergence with the board of directors.
He nevertheless received a very large golden parachute while at the same time
the company was suffering losses and announcing large lay-offs. In the
meantime, the Parliament, unwilling to be left behind, extended the scope of
the decree of 30 march 2009 by a law of 20 April 2009101. Therefore, the same
day as the publication of the law, another decree of 20 April 2009 included
some additions and modifications mainly targeted at golden parachutes102.
The two decrees apply retroactively to the conventions signed by the SPPE
and financial institutions. It applies to senior management : chairman of the
board of directors, CEO, senior executives (directeurs généraux délégués)
chairman of the managing board and chairman of the supervisory board. First,
99 Supplementary defined benefits pensions (retraites chapeaux) can be granted to
managers who have reached the retirement legal age (60 years) and who end their career
in the company. The objective is to make-up for the difference between the legal
amount of the pension and the last wage. The amount usually represent 50 to 60 % of
the last salary. The cost of this benefit is paid fully by the company.
100 Decree n82009-348 of 30 March 2009 relatif aux conditions de rémunération des
dirigeants des entreprises aidées par l’Etat ou bénéficiant du soutien de l’Etat du fait de
la crise économique et des responsables des entreprises publiques, JO 31 March 2009, p.
5622.
101 Law n82009-431 of 20 April 2009 de finance rectificative pour 2009, JO 22 April 2009,
p. 6872.
102 Decree n82009-445 of 20 April 2009 portant modernisation du fonctionnement du
Fonds de développement économique et social, JO 22 April 2009, p. 6897.
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credit institutions are prohibited to grant stock options and free shares to their
senior management. Therefore, the regime is much stricter than the one
established by the AFEP-MEDEF code. Second, the variable and exceptional
(bonus) elements of the compensation, other than stock options and free
shares, can only be authorised by the board of directors or by the supervisory
board for a maximum period of one year, and must be performance linked
through pre-established quantitative and qualitative criteria which cannot be
linked to the price of the share. The requirement that the criteria be pre-
established is a way to prevent a board to modify ex-post the criteria in order
to still give the manager a bonus if the original criteria have not been fulfilled.
The authorisation of the board is made public, in order to create a pressure on
the board to limit the amount of the variable compensation. Third, the decree
prohibits the granting and the payment of variable (Decree 30 March 2009)
and exceptional – including golden parachutes (Decree of April 20, 2009)
compensation if the company decides large lay-offs. The French regime is
therefore similar to the American Economic Emergency Stabilization Act of 3
October 2008 which prohibited the payment of golden parachute to managers
of credit institutions who received TARP funds. Finally, the decree prohibits
the attribution of supplementary defined benefits pensions (retraites cha-
peaux) to senior management, after the entry into force of the April 20, 2009
Law. This prohibition only applies to new grants and not to existing grants,
which reduced significantly the reach of the regime. However, unlike the
US103 and Germany, France did not adopt a cash remuneration cap for credit
institutions having received funds from the SPPE.
These provisions were applied to the car industry (Renault, PSA, Iveco,
Renault Trucks), including car suppliers such as Valeo, which received help
from the Economic and Social Development Fund (Fonds de développement
économique et social). The prohibition applies only to companies who
received a loan higher than E 25 millions.
The decree of 30 march 2009 also included specific rules for State owned
companies (entreprises publiques) whose securities (which definition is not
limited to shares but includes also bonds) are admitted to trading on a
regulated market. These rules apply regardless of whether or not the
companies benefited from the financial rescue plan. First, the CEO or the
chairman of the managing board must give up his or her work contract at the
latest when his or her position is renewed. Second, the variable elements of his
or her compensation must be authorized by the board and the authorization is
made public. The variable elements of the compensation cannot be linked to
the stock price. Also, the level of the golden parachute must be limited to two
years of remuneration, and can only be paid in case of forced departure, and
only if the manager satisfies performance criteria. In addition, he cannot be
103 American Recovery and Reinvestment Act of 17 february 2009.
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paid if the company is experiencing serious economic difficulties. The decree
did not deal with stock-options in State owned companies. However, the
government forced on 26 March 2009 the CEO and the vice-CEO of listed
energy company GDF-Suez, partly owned by the State (35,7 %), to renounce
to their stock-options despite the fact the company did not receive funds from
the rescue plan. This meant that companies with a large State participation
would be subject de facto to similar requirements. This was made also clear by
the fact that the decree provides that the Fonds stratégique d’investissement
must take into account in the companies where it has invested the
compensation principles stated in the decree for State owned companies.
Actions taken by the French government on the issue of compensation were at
first weak but were subsequently strengthened. However, the provisions of
the 30 March 2009 decree are only temporary and applicable until 31
December 2010. In addition, since all banks except two, Groupe Caisses
d’épargne and Groupe Banques Populaires, have reimbursed the SPPE, the
Decree 30 March 2009 is no more applicable to the banking sector. Banks are
now only subject to the AFEP-MEDEF code, through their participation to
the SFEF, although for listed banks, there were already subject to this code.
b. Temporary provisions on traders’ compensation
Specific provisions were also adopted for traders’ remuneration. Credit
institutions receiving funds from the SFEF had to agree to present to the
banking commission, within six months of the signature of the convention,
their policy on traders’ remuneration104. In addition, like in the United States,
a compensation « Czar », Michel Camdessus, was appointed in September
2009 in order to monitor, in an advisory capacity, the compensation of the 100
best paid employees in credit institutions having received funds from the
SPPE105. This person is informed on the compensation policy and individual
amount paid to the 100 best paid employees and controls its conformity with
the Financial Stability Board (FSB) “Principles for sound compensation
practices”106. He also has an advisory role to management of the bank. If his
recommendations are not applied, he can inform the Banking Commission
which can trigger a prudential control, and/or the board of director, and/or
the shareholders.
In addition to these temporary provisions, the crisis lead to the adoption of
permanent provisions on compensation.
104 See. Cour des comptes, Rapport public, Les concours publics aux établissements de
crédit : premiers constats, premières Recommandations, June 2009, p. 40.
105 Ministerial Order of 10 september 2009, JO 11 September 2009, p. 14968.
106 The text is available at : www.financialstabilityboard.org/publications/r_0904b.pdf
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28) Permanent provisions
Some permanent provisions on compensation apply to all companies (a),
whereas others only apply to credit institutions (b).
a. Permanent provisions on compensation for all companies
The MEDEF published in 2003 for the first time a special report on Directors
and Officers Remuneration in listed companies107. Another recommendation
targeted at compensation was published in january 2007. Generally, the AFEP
and the MEDEF have issued recommendation when there was too much
political pressure, in order to prevent a legislative intervention. The financial
crisis did not lead the French Government to give up its traditional approach
to self-regulation in the area of manager compensation, although some legal
provisions were also adopted. Instead, the Government asked the AFEP and
the MEDEF to strengthen significantly their recommendations on compen-
sation.
This political pressure lead to the adoption of the Corporate governance code
on executive compensation of 6 October 2008108. These recommendations
were later made part of the Corporate Governance Code. The council of
Ministries of October 7, 2008 requested that listed companies adopt those
principles before the end of 2008 or a law would be passed. According to the
French securities regulator, in January 2009, almost all major listed companies
had accepted the code109. Reversing its long standing previous position, the
MEDEF then decided to monitor the application of its Corporate governance
code, including principles on compensation, by the largest listed companies
(CAC 40 and SBF 120) and to publish an annual compliance report. The latest
report published in December 2008 indicates that principles on Corporate
Governance and compensation are generally well applied. In addition, at the
request of the Government, a « wise men » committee chaired by the former
CEO of AXA, Claude Bébéar, was established and can be requested by
companies for advice in the application of the code.
In addition to these new soft law principles, the Parliament also adopted, or
was considering adopting, measures on executive compensation. The reason is
that there is a general feeling of a failure of self-regulation in the area of
managers’ compensation.
107 Chairman and Chief Executive Officer and Executive Directors compensation, Report
of MEDEF, Committee on Business Ethics, May 2003, 6 pp.
108 AFEP-MEDEF, Recommendations concerning the compensation of executive
directors of companies whose shares are admitted to trading on a regulated market,
October 6, 2008.
109 AMF annual report 2009, p. 102.
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On the tax side, shortly after the adoption of the October 2008 financial rescue
plan, the Parliament, following an amendment from a member of the socialist
party, adopted a provision to limit the tax deductibility of golden parachute,
whereas before it was fully deductible110. The tax deductibility was fixed at six
times the applicable annual « individual social security cap », which amounts
to approximately 200,000 euros in 2008. Another law subjected the part of
golden parachutes above 1 million euro to social contributions111. A later
December 2009 Act doubled the tax cost for companies for supplementary
defined benefits pensions (retraites chapeaux) and the Government will
present a report by 15 september 2010 on the issue112.
On the company law side, a law of 4 December 2008 required that stock-
options and grant of free shares can only be granted to senior management if
they are also granted to 90 % at least of the employees113. Several bills were
also introduced in Parliament but have not been passed so far. However, they
are interesting because they indicate the direction of future reforms.
A bill introduced by a minority party of the majority was introduced in May
2009 in the lower house (Assemblée nationale) and would have imposed a
« Say on pay » covering all elements of compensation (fix and variable,
deferred, exceptional) of senior management of listed companies114. « Say on
pay » also exists in other European countries (Denmark, Sweden, Nether-
lands, Spain, Switzerland, United-Kingdom). A positive vote would not have
prohibited the opposing shareholders from suing the company. The bill was
sent to the floor for a vote but then sent back to a committee while waiting for
the report of a parliamentary working group on the issue. The Houillon
report, named by the chair of this group, was released soon after in July
2009115. The Houillon report proposed among other legislative measures, that
compensation of senior management should comply with the « company
110 Art. 21, Law n82008-1425 of 27 December 2008 for finance, JO 28 December 2008, p.
20224.
111 Art. 14, Law n8 2008-1330 of 17 December 2008 de financement de la sécurité sociale
pour 2009, OJ of 18 Decembre 2008 p. 19291.
112 Law n82009-1646 of 24 December 2009 de financement de la sécurité sociale pour 2010,
OJ of 27 Decembre 2009 p. 22392.
113 Art. L. 225-186-1 and Art. L. 225-197-6 Commercial code. Art. 22, Law n8 2008-1258
of 3 decembre 2008 en faveur des revenus du travail, OJ of 4 decembre 2008, p. 18488.
114 See. Proposition de loi visant à démocratiser le mode de fixation des rémunérations des
mandataires sociaux dans les sociétés anonymes, n81761, Assemblée nationale,
Enregistré à la Présidence de l’Assemblée nationale le 13 mai 2009.
115 See. Rapport d’information par la Commision des lois constitutionnelles, de la
législation et de l’administration générale de la République, sur les rémunérations des
dirigeants mandataires sociaux et des opérateurs de marchés, présenté par M. Philippe
Houillon, n81798, Assemblée Nationale, Enregistré à la Présidence de l’Assemblée
nationale le 7 juillet 2009.
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general interest », that a compensation committee should be created in large
listed companies, imposed a prohibition for a senior executive to hold at the
same time an employment contract (already provided by the AFEP-MEDEF
code), a prohibition on supplementary defined benefits pensions (retraites
chapeaux), and the application of the regime of conflicted transactions (Art. L.
225– 38 Commercial code) to all exceptional remuneration (golden para-
chutes, golden hello…). A bill was introduced in October 2009 and passed in
the upper court (Sénat) in November 2009 in order to cap the compensation
paid to a person holding a position both in State-owned company and in the
private sector116. Separately, another bill was introduced in Assemblée
Nationale in September 2009 and passed in October 2009 which created for
large listed companies an obligation to create a compensation committee117.
The initial draft, introduced by the socialist opposition, dealt directly with the
issue of compensation and favored caps on compensations in all listed
companies118.
These provisions are in line with a pre-existing trend in France since 2005 to
move from self-regulation to hard law on compensation and to make it harder
for listed companies to adopt excessive or unjustified compensation. As for
stock-options, for instance, since a 2006 Act, the exercise of stock options (and
not just the grant) by senior officers, directors and members of the supervisory
board is strictly regulated. Stock-options cannot be exercised by their
beneficiaries before the end of their term in office, or they have to keep until
116 Proposition de loi tendant à interdire ou à réglementer le cumul des fonctions et des
rémunérations de dirigeant d’une entreprise du secteur public et d’une entreprise du
secteur privé, Sénat, Enregistré à la Présidence du Sénat le 6 octobre 2009. The bill is
currently scheduled for a vote in the lower House of Parliament.
117 See. Proposition de loi visant à créer un comité des rémunérations dans les sociétés
anonymes excédant certains seuils de chiffre d’affaires et d’effectifs, Assemblée
Nationale, Texte adopté n8335, 20 octobre 2009. The bill is currently pending in the
Senate and there is no indication that it will be sent to the floor for a vote.
118 See. Proposition de loi visant à rendre plus justes et plus transparentes les politiques de
rémunérations des dirigeants d’entreprises et des opérateurs de marché, Assemblée
nationale, 2 septembre 2009. The initial draft would have capped the remuneration of
senior management (CEO, chairman of the board of directors, chairman of the
managing board and chairman of the supervisory board) of companies who benefited
from the recapitalisation scheme to around 300 000 euros (Art. 1). For all listed
companies, the compensation of senior management (CEO, chairman of the board of
directors, chairman of the managing board and chairman of the supervisory board ;
senior executives) would be capped by a decision of the board to a multiple of the
lowest remuneration paid within the company and subject to a vote of the GSM (Art.
3). The amount of a golden parachute and supplementary defined benefits pensions
(retraites chapeaux) paid to senior management (CEO, chairman of the board of
directors, chairman of the managing board and chairman of the supervisory board)
would be more severly capped (Art. 4 and 5). Finally, stock-options would only by
allowed in companies not older than 5 years, that is start-ups (Art. 7).
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the end of their term a certain part of the shares acquired through the option
(“Balladur” amendment)119. The choice is to be made by the board of directors
or by the supervisory board. The information relating to this choice has to be
disclosed in the annual report. An identical rule applies to grants of free
shares120. As to golden parachutes, a 2005 Act submitted those granted to the
CEO, chairman of the board and executive officer of listed companies
(directors are not concerned), by the company itself or by any controlled or
controlling company, to ex-ante approval by the board of directors and ex-
post approval to the general meeting of shareholders121. Each individual
golden parachute is subject to a separate vote at the general meeting of
shareholders level. A new vote is required each time that the position is
renewed, which under French company law, will be at most every 5 years.
Another 2007 Act, prohibited golden parachutes which payment are not
subject to conditions of performance, appreciated with regards to the
performance of the company of which he is CEO or executive officer122.
Conditions of performance relate to strategic or commercial objectives,
rentability… Finally, as to supplementary retirement benefits (Retraites
chapeau), the 2005 CME had Act submitted supplementary retirement
benefits granted to the CEO, chairman of the board and executive officer of
listed companies (directors are not concerned), by the company itself or by
any controlled or controlling company, to ex-ante approval by the board of
directors and ex-post vote to the general meeting of shareholders123.
Therefore the latest developments in the area of manager compensation
triggered by the financial crisis seem to be only a part of a trend to limit
compensation abuses. The temporary provision of the decrees of March and
April 2009 only took this tendency one step further. Therefore, there is a
reasonable degree of probability that some provisions of the temporary
measures will be turned into hard law.
b. Credit institutions
As to credit institutions, the French Government was also very active but
focused mainly on traders’ remuneration. Like with the AFEP-MEDEF code,
the Government also requested in December 2008 professionals to draft self-
119 Art. L. 225-177 and L. 225-179 Commercial code. Law n82006-1770 of 30 December
2006 pour le développement de la participation et de l’actionnariat salarié et portant
diverses dispositions d’ordre économique et social, OJ of 31 Decembre 2006 p. 20210.
120 Art. L. 225-197-1 Commercial code.
121 Art. L. 225-42-1 Commercial code. Law n8 2005-842 of July 26, 2005 pour la confiance
et la modernisation de l’économie, OJ of 27 July 2005 p. 12160.
122 Art. L. 225-42-1 Commercial code. Law n8 2007-1223 du 21 août 2007 en faveur du
travail, de l’emploi et du pouvoir d’achat, OJ of 22 August 2007 p. 13945.
123 Art. L. 225-42-1 Commercial code
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regulatory principles. Therefore, the French Banking Federation (FBF), in
close cooperation with the Government, drafted and issued in February 2009
principles on traders’ remuneration (« Pauget » principles)124. This code
provides that bonuses must be calculated on annual effective results and take
into account several years. France was the first country to adopt such type of
provision.
Banking regulation was modified in order to allow the banking regulator to
check the adequation of the remuneration policy with the risk created by such
policy125. The banking regulator can take sanctions in case these principles are
not applied.
On August 25, 2009, the French Government also announced measures on
traders’ remuneration. However, so as not to prejudice the Paris financial
centre, these measures were only implemented on 3 November 2009126. The
reason was that France waited for the G-20 Pittsburg meeting of Head of
States to endorse the FSB “Implementation Standards for sound compensa-
tion practices” issued on September 25, 2009. Then, the new regulations were
issued just before the St Andrews G-20 Finance Ministries of 6 November
2009. The rules were also fleshed out by the FBF127 so that the measures result
from hard law and soft law provisions.
These measures provide that a significant part of compensation must be
variable, based on individual, business-unit and firm-wide measures that
adequately measure performance. They provide that guaranteed bonus should
be limited to one year maximum and only admitted in case of hiring. A
significant part of variable compensation must be deferred, paid pro rata
temporis, tied to performance, subject to appropriate clawback and vested in
the form of stock or stock-like instruments. At least 50 % (60 % for the
highest paid) of variable compensation for one fiscal year (N+1) must be
deferred on the three following years (FBF professional norms, November
2009). At least 50 % of variable compensation granted for one fiscal year must
be in share or share-linked instrument (FBF professional norms, November
2009). There must be a minimum vesting or holding period of two years.
124 FBF, Groupe de travail de Place, Rémunération des professionnels des marchés
financiers, 9 February 2009.
125 Art. 5 g), Regulation 97-02. Ministerial order of 14 janvier 2009 modifiant le règlement
n8 97-02 du 21 février 1997 relatif au contrôle interne des établissements de crédit et des
entreprises d’investissement, OJ of 30 January 2009 p. 1703.
126 See. Art. 31-4, Regulation 97-02. Ministerial Order of 3 novembre 2009 relatif aux
rémunérations des personnels dont les activités sont susceptibles d’avoir une incidence
sur l’exposition aux risques des établissements de crédit et entreprises d’investissement,
JO 5 November 2009, p. 19115.
127 FBF, Professional norms regarding the governance and variable compensation for
financial markets professionals (November 2009)
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Deferred compensation must be reduced or suppressed in case of losses in the
activity. The determination of the global amount of variable compensation
must take into account liquidity risk, capital requirements, and must be
subject to reduction in case of loss. Credit institutions must establish a
compensation committee, composed of a majority of competent independent
directors. The annual report to the banking commission must include
developments on traders compensations policy and practice. Finally, the
Firms’ compensation policies and structures must be disclosed in one place to
be chosen by the firm and disclosed before the general shareholders’ meeting.
French regulation and self-regulatory norms on traders’ compensation closely
implement the FSB principles and G-20 decisions. This is not surprising since
France was quite influential in the debate on traders’ compensation.
IV. Conclusion
France has been very active in order to react to the financial crisis both from a
financial and an economic point of view, although its financial sector was less
severely hit than the United States and other large countries. The financial
rescue plan has been quickly introduced and was financially profitable for the
French State. France also adopted several effective economic support
measures. Therefore, the French approach to the financial crisis can be
considered a success.
At the national level, the French State has been very interventionist,
requesting and generally obtaining management changes. The French
government has also been very interventionist and active in the area of
compensation and has targeted stock-options, golden parachutes and bonuses.
It succeeded in forcing several managers to give up stock-options (Société
Générale) or golden parachutes (Dexia). The provisions adopted by the
AFEP-MEDEF were also adopted under very strong political pressure.
Although there is no law foreseen on the issue of managers’ compensation by
the end of the first semester 2010, the issue could return to the first stage before
the end of 2010 when the temporary measures included in the financial rescue
plan will lapse. There is a some degree of probability that these temporary
measures will be turned into hard law at that time, or at least that the issue will
be raised.
At the European and international level, France has also been very active to try
to promote its agenda on banking regulation and bankers’ compensation.
France, who benefited from the support of the labour Government in the
United Kingdom, has also been quite successful in this area in promoting its
agenda.
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However, taking a longer view, there are two points which can be raised. First,
it is regrettable that France did not size the opportunity to pass a law, like in
Germany, to allow for nationalizing or taking control of an ailing financial
institution. An opportunity might have been missed. Second, France, like
Germany, successfully took advantage of the crisis to fight tax heavens and
request wider cooperation by countries having a strong banking secrecy laws.
France and Germany also insisted to request a stronger regulation of hedge
funds in Europe. However, it can hardly be considered that tax heavens or
countries with strong banking secrecy law contributed to the financial crisis.
The crisis started in the United States and the United Kingdom whose
financial regulation was the most developed in the world. The same can be said
of Hedge funds which, as an industry, were generally hurt by the crisis. The
financial crisis provided the opportunity to tackle these issues which like the
issue of compensation are politically attractive. However, it would be
dangerous to give too much attention to issues which were not at the heart of
the financial crisis if this would led to walking away from the really necessary
financial reforms.
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